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Abstract—The growing demand for edge computing resources, particularly due to increasing popularity of Internet of Things (IoT), and
distributed machine/deep learning applications poses a significant challenge. On the one hand, certain edge service providers (ESPs)
may not have sufficient resources to satisfy their applications according to the associated service-level agreements. On the other hand,
some ESPs may have additional unused resources. In this paper, we propose a resource-sharing framework that allows different ESPs
to optimally utilize their resources and improve the satisfaction level of applications subject to constraints such as communication cost
for sharing resources across ESPs. Our framework considers that different ESPs have their own objectives for utilizing their resources,
thus resulting in a multi-objective optimization problem. We present an N -person Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) for resource
allocation and sharing among ESPs with Pareto optimality guarantee. Furthermore, we propose a distributed, primal-dual algorithm to
obtain the NBS by proving that the strong-duality property holds for the resultant resource sharing optimization problem. Using
synthetic and real-world data traces, we show numerically that the proposed NBS based framework not only enhances the ability to
satisfy applications’ resource demands, but also improves utilities of different ESPs.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Edge computing has received much attention recently as
it enables on-demand provisioning of computing resources
for different applications and tasks at the network edge [1]–
[3]. One of the fundamental advantages of edge computing
is that it can provide resources with low latencies when
compared with traditional cloud computing architecture [2].
The demand for edge computing has further increased due
to the advent of Internet of Things (IoT) [4] and wide-scale
use of machine and deep learning [5] in different industries
as these learning-based models can be trained and run
using edge computing nodes with adequate storage and
computing power [6].
A typical edge computing system consists of a large
number of edge nodes that have different types of resources.
Edge service provider (ESP) earns a utility for allocating
resources to different applications and guarantees to pro-
vide resources according to a Service Level Agreement (SLA).
However, when compared with cloud computing systems
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and data centers, resources in an edge setting are limited.
Therefore, optimal use and allocation of these limited re-
sources has been an active area of research. Even when
resources are available, allocating them to applications with
the goal of maximizing overall ESP utility is a difficult
problem. Furthermore, the aforementioned resource inten-
sive paradigms such as deep learning, and data analytics
exacerbate the problem by challenging the scalability of
traditional resource allocation techniques.
ESPs typically provide enough resources to different
applications at their edge nodes to meet the peak demand.
However, it is highly likely that resources of one ESP will
be over-utilized, while other ESP’s resources will be under-
utilized. For example, an ESP provisions resources to an
application at an edge node that is physically closest to
the requesting application. However, if the closest edge
node has a resource deficit or is overloaded, the request
can be satisfied through ESP’s next closest edge node that
may physically be at a distant location or deep in the
network such as at the data center. This incurs high cost and
causes high latency that may not be acceptable for delay
constrained applications. One possible solution is to create
a shared resource pool with other ESPs that are physically
closer [7]–[10]. Such a resource pool allows ESPs to share
and use resources whenever needed to meet their dynamic
demands. This cooperation and resource sharing among
ESPs seem beneficial for them, because it is unlikely that
resources of different ESPs will be simultaneously over-
utilized. Furthermore, cooperation among different service
providers or vendors also exists in real life as well. For
example, Amazon and Netflix compete with each other
in video streaming business. However, Netflix also relies
on Amazon’s web services to provide its video streaming
services.
Our work has also been motivated by military settings
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2in which two or more coalition partners1 are jointly conduct-
ing a military operation using different resources from the
partners. As military settings usually have strict latency and
reliability requirements, resources are placed at the edge
to fulfill the aforementioned requirements. Hence, coalition
settings can be considered a practical scenario for edge
computing. In contrast with commercial edge computing
settings, military settings require a higher reliability and
robustness to ensure timely availability of resources. As
seen in Figure 1, both coalition partners 2 and 3 satisfy
all their applications and have resource surpluses whereas
partner 1 has resource deficits when working alone. How-
ever, through cooperation among these coalition partner, 1
satisfies its applications by using resources of other coalition
partners resulting in an improved utility for all partners. It
is evident that if different coalition partners do not share
resources, different application requests cannot be satisfied.
Therefore, there is a need for a framework that allows
resource sharing among these coalition partners (i.e., ESPs).
Furthermore, the framework needs to be distributed as a
centralized solution may not be acceptable to the different
coalition partners or ESPs because:
• An adversary can target the central system causing
the entire military operation to fail.
• Coalition partners need to reach a consensus for
choosing the central node that runs the resource
sharing algorithm.
• A centralized framework requires a large amount of
information to be transmitted to the central node.
This may not be feasible or preferred by the coalition
partners as certain information may be private.
Such a distributed resource sharing gives rise to a number
of questions such as:
1) Should an ESP help another ESP by sharing resources?
2) How should resources be allocated to applications across
different ESPs, while considering issues such as commu-
nication cost and resource fragmentation?
3) How can ESPs share the profits of resource sharing?
We answer these questions in this paper.
1.2 Methodology and contributions
In this paper, we consider a number of ESPs that share
their resources and form a resource pool to satisfy resource
requests of different applications as shown in Figure 1.
We formulate such resource sharing and allocation among
ESPs as a multi-objective optimization (MOO) problem, for
which our goal is to achieve a Pareto optimal solution.
Furthermore, since Pareto solutions are spread over the
Pareto frontier [11], choosing a single solution among them
is challenging. As the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) [12]
guarantees the provision of a fair and Pareto optimal solu-
tion to such a MOO problem, we develop a distributed NBS-
based framework for resource allocation and sharing here.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first generic NBS-based
framework for resource sharing and allocation among ESPs.
The main contributions of this paper are:
1. Each coalition partner can be considered an ESP.
Fig. 1: Cooperation among ESPs
1) We present an NBS based resource sharing frame-
work for ESPs with different objectives in allocat-
ing resources to meet the dynamic demands. Our
framework also considers practical engineering con-
straints such as communication costs and resource
fragmentation.
2) We show that ESPs can benefit from sharing re-
sources with other ESPs as they can earn a higher
profit and improve the average application satisfac-
tion.
3) We show that strong-duality property holds for the
formulated problem, which enables us to propose a
distributed algorithm to obtain the NBS.
4) We evaluate the performance of our algorithms us-
ing synthetic and real world traces. Results show
that resource sharing improves the utilities of ESPs,
increases resource utilization and enhances average
user (application) satisfaction. Furthermore, our re-
sults show that the profit sharing among ESPs is also
fair.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We present
the system model in Section 2. In Section 3, we first present
a primer on NBS. We then describe our proposed NBS
framework for resource sharing and allocation. In Section 4,
we present a distributed algorithm for obtaining the NBS.
In Section 5, we present simulation results of the proposed
framework for different settings. We describe the related
work in Section 6, and conclude the paper in Section 7.
2 SYSTEM MODEL
Let N = {1, 2, · · · , N} be the set of all ESPs. We assume
that each provider has a set of K = {1, 2, · · · ,K} types of
resources such as communication, computation and storage
resources. Cn = {Cn,1, · · · , Cn,K}, with Cn,k denoting the
amount of type k resources available at service provider n.
Each service provider n has a set of native applications
Mn = {1, 2, · · · ,Mn}. The set of all applications that
request resources from all service providers is given by
M =M1 ∪M2 · · · ∪MN , where we assumeMi ∩Mj =
∅, ∀i 6= j, i.e., each application initially demands resources
from only its native service provider. We also define M
3TABLE 1: List of notations used throughout the paper
Notation Description
N , N, n Set, number and index of ESPs
K,K, k Set, number and index of resources
M,M, j Set, number and index of applications
Mn Set of native applications at ESP n
C Capacity vector of all ESPs
Cn Capacity vector of ESP n
Cn,k Capacity of resource k at ESP n
Rn Request matrix at ESP n
rjn,k Request of application j for resource k from ESP n
xjn,k Allocation decision of resource k for application j at
ESP n
xjn Allocation decision vector for application j at ESP n
when working alone, i.e., xjn = [x
j
n,1, · · · , xjn,K ]T
Xn Allocation decision for ESP n in the resource sharing
case
X Allocation decision for the entire set of ESPs
uj(xjn,k) Utility ESP n earns by allocating resource k to applica-
tion j
uj(xjn) Utility ESP n earns by allocating vector of resources to
application j
to represent M\Mn and N to represent N\n. Every ESP
n ∈ N has a request (requirement) matrix Rn,
Rn =
[ r1n
.
.
.
rMnn
]
=
[ r1n,1 ··· ··· r1n,K
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
rMnn,1 ··· ··· rMnn,K
]
, (1)
Here rjn,k is the amount of resource k that application j ∈Mn requires. When an ESP is working alone (no sharing of
its resources with any other service provider), its objective
is to maximize its utility by allocating resources to its native
applications. A service provider n earns a utility uj(xjn,k)
by allocating xjn,k amount of resource k to application j ∈
Mn, where the vector xjn = [xjn,1, xjn,2, · · · , xjn,K ]T . Table
1 contains notations used throughout the paper. We present
the optimization formulation for a single service provider
in Section 2.1, followed by a formulation for the multiple
service provider problem in Section 2.2.
2.1 Problem Formulation for Single Service Provider
We first present the resource allocation problem for a stand-
alone single service provider (i.e., no resource sharing with
other service providers). For a single ESP n ∈ N , the
allocation decision consists of vectors x1n, · · · ,xMnn . The
optimization problem is:
max
x1n,··· ,xMnn
∑
j∈Mn,
k∈K
uj(xjn,k), (2a)
s.t.
∑
j
xjn,k ≤ Cn,k, ∀k ∈ K, (2b)
xjn,k ≤ rjn,k, ∀ j ∈Mn, k ∈ K, (2c)
xjn,k ≥ 0, ∀ j ∈Mn, k ∈ K. (2d)
The goal of a single service provider in solving this single
objective optimization (SOO) problem, as mentioned ear-
lier, is to maximize its utility by appropriately allocating
resources. The first constraint (2b) indicates that allocated
resources cannot exceed capacity. The second constraint
(2c) reflects that allocated resources should not exceed the
requested amounts. The last constraint, (2d) says the allo-
cation cannot be negative. However, it is possible that a
service provider n may earn a larger utility by providing
its resources to applications of other service providers or
it may not have sufficient resources to satisfy requests of
all its native applications. On the other hand, there may be
another service provider m ∈ N\n that may have a surplus
of resources, which can be “rented" by service provider n.
Below, we discuss resource sharing among these service
providers.
2.2 Multiple Service Providers Problem Formulation
Allowing resource sharing among service providers, while
considering their objectives, could improve resource uti-
lization and application satisfaction. Let Dj(xjn,k) denote
the communication cost of serving application j ∈ Mm at
service provider n rather than at its native service provider
m. By sharing its resources, ESP n earns a utility,
uj(
∑
m∈N
xjm,k + x
j
n,k)− uj(
∑
m∈N
xjm,k)−Dj(xjn,k), (3)
after allocating xjn,k for application j ∈ Mm, i.e., the net
utility ESP n earns is calculated as the differential utility
(uj(
∑
m∈N x
j
m,k + x
j
n,k) − uj(
∑
m∈N x
j
m,k)) earned due to
providing xkn,k amount of resources minus the communica-
tion cost between the native and non-native ESP. We assume
that uj(xjn,k) = u
j(xjm,k) when x
j
n,k = x
j
m,k. We also let
xj = [
∑
n∈N
xjn,1,
∑
n∈N
xjn,2, · · · ,
∑
n∈N
xjn,K ]
T ,
i.e., the total resource allocated to any application j ∈ M
is the sum of resources allocated to application j from
all service providers. The resource sharing and allocation
algorithm, based on resource requests and capacities of
service providers, has to make an allocation that opti-
mizes utilities of all service providers n ∈ N and satisfy
user requests as well. The allocation decision is given by
X = {X1,X2, · · · ,XN}, where Xn, ∀n ∈ N is given by:
Xn =
[ x1n
.
.
.
x|M|n
]
=
[ x1n,1 ··· ··· x1n,K
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
x
|M|
n,1 ··· ··· x|M|n,K
]
. (4)
Each service provider aims to maximize the sum of utilities
by allocating its resources to its native applications, and al-
locating resources to applications belonging to other service
providers. Each provider n ∈ N solves the following multi-
objective optimization problem.
max
Xn
∑
j∈Mn,
k∈K
(
uj(
∑
m∈N
xjm,k + x
j
n,k)− uj(
∑
m∈N
xjm,k)
)
+
( ∑
l∈M,
k∈K
(
ul(
∑
m∈N
xlm,k + x
l
n,k)− ul(
∑
m∈N
xlm,k)
−Dl(xln,k)
))
, (5a)
s.t.
∑
j
xjn,k ≤ Cn,k, ∀ k ∈ K, n ∈ N , (5b)
4∑
m∈N
xjm,k ≤ rjn,k, ∀ j ∈M, k ∈ K, n ∈ N , (5c)
xjn,k ≥ 0, ∀ j ∈M, k ∈ K, n ∈ N , (5d)
ul(
∑
m∈N
xlm,k + x
l
n,k)− ul(
∑
m∈N
xlm,k)−
Dl(xln,k) ≥ 0,∀l ∈M\Mn, k ∈ K, n ∈ N . (5e)
The first summation term in (5a) represents the utility
earned by an ESP providing resources to the native ap-
plications, whereas the second summation term describes
the utility earned by providing resources to non-native
applications. Note that constraint (5b) indicates that the total
allocated resources cannot exceed the resource capacity of
the service providers. (5c) states that the total amount of
resources allocated to any application using the resource-
sharing framework cannot exceed the amount of requested
resources. (5d) says that the resource allocation cannot be
negative whereas (5e) indicates that the incremental increase
in utility earned by providing resources to non-native appli-
cations should be non-negative.
2.3 Assumptions
In our model, we assume that each utility is a concave
injective function for which the inverse of the first derivative
exists, such as (1 − e−x). Strictly speaking, our centralized
NBS framework requires only concave injective utility func-
tions [13]. However, the existence of the inverse of the first
derivative is required for the distributed NBS (see details
in Section 3). The communication cost is a convex function,
hence the objective function in (5) is concave. All resources
are fully utilized in the optimal solution. However, there
are enough resources to provide a positive utility to all
service providers when sharing resources. This is a realistic
assumption as the demand for resources is usually more
than the supply. Furthermore, we assume that when ESPs
share resources, there exist solutions that are better than
when they are all working alone. This assumption can be
relaxed, that is, if certain ESPs cannot improve their utility
using the bargaining solution, they will not participate in
the resource sharing framework. However, the framework
can still be used for the remaining ESPs.
2.4 Choice of utility function
While our framework works with any utility that satisfies
the conditions in Section 2.3, choosing a suitable utility
function along with the communication cost can minimize
resource fragmentation2. Generally, a concave utility has a
steeper slope at start that becomes flatter as more resources
are allocated, i.e., the rate of increase in the payoff for
allocating resources reduces with increase in the amount
of allocated resources. This results in an ESP providing a
fraction of originally requested resources to an application
and keeping the remaining resources for other applications.
Hence, the application does not get all the resources it
needed, and has to ask another ESP for more resources,
resulting in resource fragmentation. For example, assume
2. We define resource fragmentation as the process in which resources
provided to an application j are split across multiple ESPs rather than
a single ESP.
that two applications require 4 units of a particular resource
from ESP n that only has 3 units available. Due to the
nature of many concave utilities, ESP n for maximizing its
utility will provide part of its resources to one application
and the remaining resources to the other application rather
than providing all 3 available units to one application and
borrowing resources for the other application. This causes
resource fragmentation, i.e., both applications received only
a part of the required resources and they will need to
obtain the remaining amount from other ESP(s). To avoid
such problems, we propose that the utility function should
consider:
• Minimum acceptable amount of resources: The ESPs
should earn either zero utility or a negative utility if
the resources provided are not within δ units of the
requested resource rjn,k. Rather than using a utility
function such as 1− e−(xjn,k) that pays the ESP even
when a small amount of resources are provided, it
is better to use 1 − e−(xjn,k−rjn,k+δ) that becomes
positive only when the allocation xjn,k is within δt
units of the requested resource rjn,k. Such a utility
along with the communication cost helps minimize
the aforementioned fragmentation problem.
3 NBS FOR RESOURCE SHARING AMONG CSPS
We first present an introduction to NBS and then discuss
our proposed NBS based resource sharing framework.
3.1 Primer on Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS)
We use a two-player game as a toy example to introduce
NBS. Consider two players 1, and 2 that need to reach an
agreement (e.g., resource allocation decision) in an outcome
space A ⊆ R2 [14]. Both players have a utility given by u1
and u2 over the space A∪{D} where D specifies a disagree-
ment outcome for players in the event of a disagreement, i.e.,
when two players cannot reach an agreement. Let S be the
set of all possible utilities that both players can achieve:
S = {(u1(a1), u2(a2))|(a1, a2) ∈ A} (6)
We also define d = (d1, d2), where d1 = u1(D) and
d2 = u2(D), as the payoff each player receives at the
disagreement point. We define the bargaining problem as
the pair (S, d) where S ⊂ R2 and d ∈ S such that
• S is a convex and compact set;
• There exists s ∈ S such that s > d.
In NBS, the goal is to obtain a function f(S, d) that provides
a unique outcome in S for every bargaining problem (S, d).
Nash studied the possible outcomes (agreements) that play-
ers can reach whereas the agreements, along with the Pareto
optimality, must also satisfy the following set of axioms (also
called fairness axioms) [14]:
1) Symmetry: The bargaining solution will not dis-
criminate among players if players are indistin-
guishable, i.e., players have identical utilities.
2) Invariance to equivalent utility representation: If
a bargaining problem (S, d) is transformed into
5another bargaining problem (S ′, d′) where s′i =
γisi + ζi and d′i = γidi + ζi, γi > 0, then f(S ′, d′) =
γif(S, d) + ζi
3) Independence of irrelevant alternatives: For any
two bargaining problems (S, d) and (S ′, d) where
S ′ ⊆ S , if f(S, d) ∈ S ′, then f(S ′, d) = f(S, d).
[12] shows that there is a unique bargaining solution
that satisfies above axioms. We present it in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. [14] There exists a unique solution satisfying the
aforementioned axioms and this solution is the pair of utilities
(s∗1, s
∗
2) ∈ S that solves the following optimization problem:
max
s1,s2
(s1 − d1)(s2 − d2), s.t.(s1, s2) ∈ S, (s1, s2) ≥ (d1, d2).
(7)
The solution of (7) is the NBS. The above framework
can be extended to N players by allowing S to be an N -
dimensional space [15]. For this case, the bargaining prob-
lem (S, d), with d = (d1, d2, · · · , dN ) as the disagreement
point, becomes the unique solution of the optimization
problem below.
max
s1,··· ,sN
N∏
n=1
(sn − dn),
s.t. (s1, · · · , sN ) ∈ S,
(s1, · · · , sN ) ≥ (d1, · · · , dN ). (8)
Solving (7) is easier compared to the N−player bargaining
problem in (8) [14]. In this paper, we transform our problem
into an equivalent convex problem that is comparatively
easier to solve.
Remark 1. As each player in an N -player bargaining game has
a particular objective to optimize, the resulting problem is multi-
objective, where the goal is to obtain a Pareto optimal solution.
NBS is a fair and Pareto optimal solution for such MOO problems,
provided that the fairness axioms are satisfied.
3.2 Proposed Framework
As mentioned earlier, NBS is a Pareto optimal and fair
solution in settings that involve different players (ESPs in
our case) where each player has an objective to optimize.
Therefore, it can be used to solve our MOO problem in
(5) as we have different ESPs that need to optimize their
objectives and improve their utilities over what they would
receive working alone. We first specify the disagreement
point for our bargaining problem. If the ESPs cannot come
to an agreement, they can all start working alone. Hence
the disagreement point is the solution to the SOO problem
given in (2) for all ESPs. Let us denote the solution to the
SOO problem by d0n,∀ n ∈ N . In the cooperative setting3,
the utility (represented by sn in (8)) for an ESP n ∈ N is
given by:
U =
∑
j∈Mn,
k∈K
(
uj(
∑
m∈N
xjm,k + x
j
n,k)− uj(
∑
m∈N
xjm,k)
)
3. Service providers share resources among each other.
+
( ∑
l∈M,
k∈K
(
ul(
∑
m∈N
xlm,k + x
l
n,k)− ul(
∑
m∈N
xlm,k)−
Dl(xln,k)
))
.
Below, we present the centralized NBS algorithm.
3.2.1 Centralized NBS
We first present the optimization problem to obtain NBS
for our N−ESP bargaining game [15] and then present its
equivalent problem [13] that is computationally efficient to
solve.
Theorem 2. The NBS for the MOO optimization problem in (5)
can be obtained by solving the following optimization problem:
max
X
N∏
n=1
( ∑
j∈Mn,
k∈K
(
uj(
∑
m∈N
xjm,k + x
j
n,k)− uj(
∑
m∈N
xjm,k)
)
+
( ∑
l∈M,
k∈K
(
ul(
∑
m∈N
xlm,k + x
l
n,k)− ul(
∑
m∈N
xlm,k)
−Dl(xln,k)
))− d0n), (9a)
s.t. Constraints in (5b)− (5e),∑
j∈Mn,
k∈K
(
uj(
∑
m∈N
xjm,k + x
j
n,k)− uj(
∑
m∈N
xjm,k)
)
+
( ∑
l∈M,
k∈K
(
ul(
∑
m∈N
xlm,k + x
l
n,k)− ul(
∑
m∈N
xlm,k)
−Dl(xln,k)
))
> d0n, ∀ n ∈ N . (9b)
Proof. The feasible set for the above optimization problem
is convex and compact, since all constraints are convex and
intersection of convex sets is a convex set. Furthermore,
based on our assumptions, there exist solutions (allocation
and sharing decisions) that provide better utility than the
disagreement point d0n,∀ n ∈ N . Hence, the solution of the
optimization problem in (9) is the NBS.
However, solving (9) is computationally complex and
the problem is not always convex. Therefore, there is a need
for an efficient method to obtain the NBS. Toward this goal,
we transform the problem (9) into an equivalent problem as
proposed in [13].
Corollary 1. The NBS for (5) is obtained by solving the following
optimization problem:
max
X
N∑
n=1
ln
( ∑
j∈Mn,
k∈K
(
uj(
∑
m∈N
xjm,k + x
j
n,k)−
uj(
∑
m∈N
xjm,k)
)
+
( ∑
l∈M,
k∈K
(
ul(
∑
m∈N
xlm,k + x
l
n,k)
− ul(
∑
m∈N
xlm,k)−Dl(xln,k)
))− d0n), (10)
s.t. Constraints in (5b)− (5e), (9b).
6Proof. ESP utilities are concave and bounded above. Fur-
thermore, the feasible set along with the set of achievable
utilities (S) is convex and compact (due to the nature of
utilities and constraints). Utilities of ESPs are also injective
functions of the allocation decision. Hence (10) is equivalent
to (9) [13]. Since the logarithm of any positive real number
is concave [16], (10) is a convex optimization problem with
a unique solution, which is the NBS.
The centralized Algorithm 1 provides the allocation de-
cision using NBS.
Algorithm 1 Centralized Algorithm for NBS
Input: C,R, and vector of utility functions of all ESPs u
Output: The optimal resource allocation X and payoffs
of all ESPs
Step 1:
for n ∈ N do
d0n ← Objective function at optimal
point in Equation (2)
end for
Step 2: X ← Solution of the optimization
problem in Equation (10)
4 DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM FOR NBS
While resource allocation and sharing using a central algo-
rithm is feasible, it is desirable to develop low overhead
distributed algorithms. To obtain a distributed algorithm,
we rely on Duality Theory and use the Lagrangian function in
(11). The dual optimization problem is given by
min
α,β,ζ,γ,pi
D(α,β, ζ, γ, pi) = L(X∗(α,β, ζ, γ, pi),
α,β, ζ, γ, pi
)
,
s.t. α,β, ζ, γ, pi ≥ 0. (12)
X∗(α,β, ζ, γ, pi) = arg max
X
L(X,α,β, ζ, γ, pi). (13)
The dual problem can be solved iteratively using gradient
descent (since the dual problem is a minimization problem)
as below:
αn,k[t+ 1] = αn,k[t]− φn,k ∂L(X,α,β, ζ, γ, pi)
∂αn,k
,
βjk[t+ 1] = β
j
k[t]− ηjk
∂L(X,α,β, ζ, γ, pi)
∂βjk
,
ζn[t+ 1] = ζn[t]− ωn ∂L(X,α,β, ζ, γ, pi)
∂ζn
,
γjn,k[t+ 1] = γ
j
n,k[t]− θjn,k
∂L(X,α,β, ζ, γ, pi)
∂γjn,k
,
piln,k[t+ 1] = pi
l
n,k[t]− ψln,k
∂L(X,α,β, ζ, γ, pi)
∂piln,k
, (14)
where φn,k, η
j
k, ωn, θ
j
n,k and ψ
l
n,k are positive step sizes.
Furthermore, the gradients in (14) are given below.
∂L(X,α,β, ζ, γ, pi)
∂αn,k
= (Cn,k −
∑
j∈M
xjn,k),
∂L(X,α,β, ζ, γ, pi)
∂βjk
= (rjk −
∑
n∈N
xjn,k),
∂L(X,α,β, ζ, γ, pi)
∂ζn
=
( ∑
j∈Mn,
k∈K
(
uj(
∑
m∈N
xjm,k + x
j
n,k)−
uj(
∑
m∈N
xjm,k)
)
+
( ∑
l∈M,
k∈K
(
ul(
∑
m∈N
xlm,k + x
l
n,k)−
ul(
∑
m∈N
xlm,k)−Dl(xln,k)
))− d0n),
∂L(X,α,β, ζ, γ, pi)
∂γjn,k
= xjn,k,
∂L(X,α,β, ζ, γ, pi)
∂piln,k
=
(
ul(
∑
m∈N
xlm,k + x
l
n,k)−
ul(
∑
m∈N
xlm,k)−Dl(xln,k)
)
. (15)
Unless certain conditions such as Slater’s constraint qualifi-
cation are satisfied, strong duality4 is not guaranteed to hold
for our primal and dual problems [16]. However, we rely on
the following theorems to show that strong duality holds.
Theorem 3 (Sufficient Condition [17]). If the price based
function X∗(α,β, ζ, γ, pi) is continuous at one or more of the
optimal Lagrange multipliers, the iterative algorithm consisting
of (13) and (14) will converge to the global optimal solution.
Theorem 4 (Necessary Condition [17]). The condition in
Theorem 3 is also necessary if at least one of the constraints in
(10) is active (binding) at the optimal solution.
Lemma 1. At the optimal solution, the optimal Lagrange multi-
plier vector corresponding to the capacity constraint is non-zero,
i.e., α∗k > 0.
Proof. At the optimal point, all resources are fully utilized,
i.e., capacity constraints are active. From complementary
slackness [16], we know that
α∗n,k
( ∑
j∈M
x∗jn,k − Cn,k
)
= 0,∀n ∈ N . (16)
Since
∑
j∈M x
∗j
n,k = Cn,k, i.e., the constraint is active, which
implies that α∗k > 0.
Theorem 5. For any concave injective utility function for which
the inverse of the first derivative exists, the iterative distributed
algorithm consisting of (13) and (14) converges to the global
optimal solution.
Proof. We show that the price function obtained by
∂L(X,α,β,ζ,γ,pi)
∂xjn,k
= 0 is continuous at one or more of the
optimal Lagrange multipliers for (11).
4. Strong duality implies that there is no duality gap between the
primal and dual problem.
7L(X,α,β, ζ, γ, pi) =
N∑
n=1
ln
( ∑
j∈Mn,
k∈K
(
uj(
∑
m∈N
xjm,k + x
j
n,k)− uj(
∑
m∈N
xjm,k)
)
+
( ∑
l∈M,
k∈K
(
ul(
∑
m∈N
xlm,k + x
l
n,k)−
ul(
∑
m∈N
xlm,k)−Dl(xln,k)
))− d0n)+ ∑
n∈N ,
j∈M,
k∈K
γjn,kx
j
n,k +
∑
n∈N ,
k∈K
αn,k(Cn,k −
∑
j∈M
xjn,k) +
∑
j∈M,
k∈K
βjk(r
j
k −
∑
n∈N
xjn,k) +
∑
n∈N
ζn
( ∑
j∈Mn,
k∈K
(
ujn(
∑
m∈N
xjm,k + x
j
n,k)− uj(
∑
m∈N
xjm,k)
)
+
( ∑
l∈M,
k∈K
(
ul(
∑
m∈N
xlm,k + x
l
n,k)− ul(
∑
m∈N
xlm,k)−
Dl(xln,k)
))− d0n)+ ∑
n∈N ,
l∈M,
k∈K
piln,k
(
ul(
∑
m∈N
xlm,k + x
l
n,k)− ul(
∑
m∈N
xlm,k)−Dl(xln,k)
)
. (11)
Let u
′−j(.) and f
′−l(.) represent the inverses of the
first derivative of uj and
(
ul(
∑
m∈N x
l
m,k + x
l
n,k) −
ul(
∑
m∈N x
l
m,k)−Dl(xln,k)
)
, respectively. αn,k, β
j
k, ζn, γ
j
n,k
and piln,k are the Lagrange multipliers whereas:
∆n =
∑
j∈Mn,
k∈K
(
uj(
∑
m∈N
xjm,k + x
j
n,k)− uj(
∑
m∈N
xjm,k)
)
+
( ∑
l∈M,
k∈K
(
ul(
∑
m∈N
xlm,k + x
l
n,k)− ul(
∑
m∈N
xlm,k)−
Dl(xln,k)
))− d0n (17)
We consider two different cases
4.0.1 j ∈Mn: ∂L∂xjn,k = 0
u
′j(
∑
m∈N
xjm,k + x
j
n,k)(1 + ∆nζn)−∆n(αn,k+
βjk − γjn,k) = 0,
=⇒ u′j(
∑
m∈N
xjm,k + x
j
n,k) =
∆n(αn,k + β
j
k − γjn,k)
1 + ∆nζn
,
xjn,k = u
′−j
(
∆n(αn,k + β
j
k − γjn,k)
1 + ∆nζn
)
−
∑
m∈N
xjm,k. (18)
We prove that (18) is continuous at the optimal point by
showing that the numerator ∆n(αn,k + β
j
k − γjn,k) and
denominator 1 + ∆nζn are positive
5. At the optimal point,
the denominator (1 + ∆∗nζ
∗
n) is positive as ∆
∗
n > 0 (from
Section 2.3) and ζ∗n = 0 (from complementary slackness).
Similarly, in the numerator, (α∗n,k + β
∗j
k − γ∗jn,k) > 0, as
α∗n,k > 0 (from Lemma 1) and α
∗
n,k + β
∗j
k > γ
∗j
n,k (from
sensitivity analysis [16]). Hence, (18) is continuous at the
optimal point.
5. Positive numerator and denominator are required if u
′−j is log.
For other cases, it will suffice to prove that the denominator is non-
zero.
4.0.2 l ∈ {M\Mn}: ∂L∂xln,k = 0
f
′l(
∑
m∈N
xlm,k + x
l
n,k)(1 + ∆nζn + ∆npi
l
n,k)−∆n(αn,k+
βlk − γln,k) = 0,
=⇒ f ′l(
∑
m∈N
xlm,k + x
l
n,k) =
∆n(αn,k + β
l
k − γln,k)
1 + ∆nζn + ∆npi
j
n,k
.
xln,k = f
′−l
(
∆n(αn,k + β
l
k − γln,k)
1 + ∆nζn + ∆npi
l
n,k
)
−
∑
m∈N
xlm,k.
(19)
The continuity at optimal point can be established using ar-
guments similar to that for j ∈ Mn case. The proof of zero-
duality gap follows from Theorem 3. Hence, strong duality
holds and our proposed distributed algorithm converges to
the NBS.
For calculating xjn,k at time t, we use ∆n calculated at
t − 1. Algorithm 2 is a distributed algorithm that provides
the global optimal solution to (9).
4.0.2.1 Protocol for Distributed Execution: All ESPs
first broadcast information regarding resource requests from
their native applications. Then any randomly chosen ESP
starts allocating resources as specified in Step 2 of Algorithm
2 and updates the corresponding Lagrangian multipliers.
This ESP then passes on the information about its allocation
and updated request matrix to the next ESP (that has not yet
allocated resources in the current round6) that repeats the
same procedure until all the ESPs allocate their resources.
This process continues until the first order conditions given
in [18] are met.
5 SIMULATION RESULTS
We evaluate the performance of the proposed NBS frame-
work for resource sharing and allocation across several
settings in Table 2. Each SP has three different resources,
i.e., storage, communication and computation. The model
can be extended to include other resources/parameters. We
6. A single round consists of all the ESPs executing Step 2 of Algo-
rithm 2 once.
8Algorithm 2 Distributed Algorithm for NBS
Input: ∀ α0, β0, ζ0, γ0, pi0, C,R, vector of utility
function of all ESPs u and X0
Output: The optimal resource allocation X and payoffs
of all ESPs
Step 0: t = 0, α[t] ← α0, β[t] ← β0, ζ[t] ← ζ0, γ[t] ←
γ0,pi[t]← pi0,X[t]← X0
Step 1:
for n ∈ N do
d0n ← Objective function at optimal
point in Equation (2)
end for
Step 2: t ≥ 1
while First order conditions [18]6=true do
Compute xjn,k[t + 1] for j ∈ M, k ∈ K and n ∈ N
through (18) and (19);
Compute α[t + 1], β[t + 1], ζ[t + 1], γ[t + 1] and
pi[t+ 1] through (14) given X[t+ 1], α[t], β[t], ζ[t], γ[t]
and pi[t]
end while
study the proposed framework using both synthetic and
real-world data traces [19]–[21]. For the study with synthetic
and real-world data traces, request matrices and capacity
vectors, ∀n ∈ N are randomly generated for each setting. To
show the advantage of resource sharing for both synthetic
and data trace, we set large resource capacities at certain SPs
so that they can improve their utilities by sharing available
resources with other SPs for meeting the demand of latter
SPs.
Simulations were run in Matlab R2019a on a Core-i7
processor with 16 GB RAM. To solve the optimization prob-
lems in (2) and (10), we use the OPTI-toolbox [22]. We
evaluate our proposed algorithms from the perspective of
service providers that are interested in maximizing their
utilities and evaluate the impact of our framework on the
applications. We define application request satisfaction (RS)
as the ratio of allocated resources to requested resources.
Mathematically, average RS for an SP n in the resource
sharing case is defined as:
RSn =
∑
j∈Mn
∑
k∈K
(∑
m∈N x
j
m,k
rjn,k
)
MnK
× 100, (20)
The utility and communication cost functions used in simu-
lation are given in (21).
uj(xjn,k) = 1− e−(x
j
n,k−rjn,k+δ),
Dj(xjn,k) =
xjn,k
w
, (21)
Here δ is set to 1 and weight w is randomly chosen.
5.1 Simulations results for synthetic data
To highlight the efficacy of our framework, we compare its
performance with a setting where SPs work alone (i.e., no
resource sharing among edge SPs). In particular, we com-
pare SP utility, the average resource utilization (averaged
across all k resources) and the average request satisfaction
TABLE 2: Simulation network settings for NBS based re-
source sharing framework.
Setting Parameters
1 N = 3,Mn = 3, ∀n ∈ N ,K = 3
2 N = 3,Mn = 20, ∀n ∈ N ,K = 3
3 (data traces) N = 3,Mn = 20, ∀n ∈ N ,K = 3
4 N = 6,Mn = 6, ∀n ∈ N ,K = 3
5 N = 6,Mn = 20, ∀n ∈ N ,K = 3
TABLE 3: Summary of average request satisfaction and
resource utilization in different settings with and without
the proposed NBS sharing framework.
Setting Request Satisfaction(%) Resource Utilization(%)Alone NBS Alone NBS
1 91.39 96.90 93.37 100
2 90.93 99.04 94.01 100
3 83.30 92.44 96.76 100
4 82.96 92.94 87.54 100
5 84.85 88.94 96.13 100
(averaged across requests of all SPs applications) in Figures
2, 3, 4, 5 for settings 1, 2, 4 and 5, respectively. For the 3
SP settings, when SP 1 works alone, it has a resource deficit
(evident from 100% average resource utilization and aver-
age request satisfaction of less than 60% and 80% in Figures
2 and 3, respectively) whereas SPs 2 and 3 have resource
surpluses as indicated by less than 100% resource utilization
and 100% request satisfaction. The resource deficit results in
a lower utility and request satisfaction for SP 1.
On the other hand, both SPs 2 and 3 achieve higher
utilities by satisfying all their applications when working
alone. However, by using our resource sharing framework,
the utilities of all SPs improve as the framework provides
optimal resource sharing. For the case with three applica-
tions, average request satisfaction improves from 86.11%
(working alone) to 94.5% (resource sharing) whereas it
improves from 90.9% to 99% for the 20 application case. It is
worth noting that request satisfaction for native applications
of SPs 2 and 3 reduce as these SPs allocate their resources
to applications of SP 1 for a higher utility. Furthermore,
resource utilizations also increase for the SPs with resource
surpluses as they share their resources with the SP with a
resource deficit. Similar results are obtained for settings 4
and 5 given in Table 2. For setting 4, the request satisfac-
tion improves from 82.96% to 92.94% using our proposed
NBS framework, whereas request satisfaction improves in
setting 5 from 84.85% to 88.94% using our proposed resource
sharing framework. Table 3 summarizes request satisfac-
tions and resource utilization in different settings using our
framework and when working alone.
5.2 Results for the data traces
We use trace files from fastStorage, Rnd [19], and materna
[20], [21]. We simulate a setting with three different SPs and
randomly extract the normalized resource request informa-
tion related to the number of CPU cores, the amount of CPU
and memory (RAM) for 20 different resource requests from
fastStorage, Rnd and materna dataset. Since the datasets do
not provide the capacities of these service providers, we
assign capacities in such a way that fastStorage serves as the
SP with resource deficit while the other two have resource
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Fig. 2: Utility, average request satisfaction and average resource utilization for Setting 1 when SPs are working alone and
using our proposed NBS framework.
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Fig. 3: Utility, average request satisfaction and average resource utilization for Setting 2 when SPs are working alone and
using our proposed NBS framework.
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Fig. 4: Utility, average request satisfaction and average resource utilization for Setting 4 when SPs are working alone and
using our proposed NBS framework.
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Fig. 5: Utility, average request satisfaction and average resource utilization for Setting 5 when SPs are working alone and
using our proposed NBS framework.
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Fig. 6: Utility, average request satisfaction and average resource utilization for Setting 3 when SPs are working alone and
using our proposed NBS framework.
surplus. Figure 6 shows SP utilities, request satisfaction and
resource utilization based on the data traces. It is evident
that SP utilities improve and resource utilizations increase
to satisfy more applications by use of the proposed NBS
framework. The average request satisfaction also increases
from 83.3% to 92.05%.
5.3 Measure of Fairness
NBS is known for its fairness property [14]. In this section,
we show the fairness of our proposed NBS based resource
sharing framework for different settings given in Table 2. In
particular, to measure the degree of fairness of the proposed
sharing framework, we calculate Jain’s index7 [23], [24].
Figure 7 shows Jain’s index for different settings given in
Table 2. The value of Jain’s index is larger than 0.95 in all
the settings. Especially for scenarios with a large number
of applications, these results reveal that our framework
7. 1|N| ≤Jain’s index≤ 1 where 1 is the highest value of fairness.
Fairness Measure of the proposed NBS based framework
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Fig. 7: Jain’s Index in different settings using our proposed
NBS based resource sharing framework.
enables fair sharing and allocation of resources among SPs,
as one would expect from the product-based fairness as
offered by the NBS.
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6 RELATED WORK
6.1 Resource allocation in Edge Computing
Jiao et al. [25] propose an auction-based resource allocation
scheme for edge service providers that provide resources
for blockchains. The proposed mechanism maximizes the
social welfare and guarantees truthfulness, computational
efficiency and individual rationality. He et al. [7] analyze the
optimal provisioning of shareable and non-shareable edge
resources to different applications. Plachy et al. [26] consider
the mobility problem in mobile edge clouds and propose
a novel algorithm for selecting communication path and
VM placement. The proposed approach relies on predicting
user movement that helps in VM placement and accordingly
selecting the communication path. Nishio et al. [27] propose
a resource sharing architecture for mobile clouds that relies
on service-oriented utility functions and is closest to our
work. However, they primarily consider service latency and
rely on a centralized framework whereas we present a dis-
tributed framework that requires a specific utility function
that can be used to model different metrics such as latency,
delay, and numerous other objectives. In [28], we modeled
resource sharing among mobile edge clouds as a cooperative
game. However, the MOO problem in [28] is non-convex
that is hard to solve compared to the convex problem solved
here. Furthermore, the cooperative game based framework
lacks the fairness guaranteed by NBS. Furthermore, in con-
trast with [25], [26] and [7] that primarily consider resource
allocation, our proposed framework deals with resource
sharing among ESPs with different objectives.
6.2 NBS based Resource Allocation
Yaiche et al. [13] use NBS to allocate bandwidth for elastic
services in high speed networks. Xu et al. [29] consider the
fairness criteria when allocating resources to different cloud
users and make use of the NBS to guarantee fairness. Using
dual composition and sub-gradient method, the authors also
develop a distributed algorithm. Hassan et al. [30] propose
an NBS-based model for cost-effective and dynamic VM al-
location with multimedia traffic, and show that it can reduce
the cost of running different servers along with maximizing
resource utilization and satisfying the QoS requirements.
He et al. [31] study the optimal deployment of content in
a cloud assisted video distribution system. Feng et al. [32]
use NBS for Virtual Machine (VM) migration to maximize
the resource utilization in a video streaming data center.
In contrast with [13], [30]–[33], to the best of our knowl-
edge, our framework is first of its kind that uses NBS
for resource sharing among ESPs with different utilities
(objective functions). We show that resource sharing can
improve utilities of ESPs and enhance application satisfac-
tion. Furthermore, for a particular class of utilities, we have
proved that distributed algorithm exists for obtaining NBS
for the resource sharing and allocation problem. Table 4
summarizes some other solutions proposed in the literature
that use NBS for resource allocation in different systems.
Other distributed algorithms proposed in literature either
rely on dual decomposition [29] or gradient projection [13],
[33]. However, most of the functions are not dual decompos-
able and gradient projection is a computationally expensive
approach [34], whereas gradient descent is widely used
particularly in machine and deep learning.
7 CONCLUSIONS
The focus in this paper is to optimally utilize available
resources for satisfying a larger number of edge applications
and improving the utility of edge service providers. We
have shown that although ESPs may have different utilities,
they should share resources to improve their utilities and
enhance application request satisfaction. Resource sharing
among ESPs has been formulated as a bargaining problem
and a resource-sharing framework using Nash Bargaining
Solution (NBS) has been proposed, which has also been
shown to be beneficial for the ESPs. Since a centralized
solution for obtaining the NBS may not always be desir-
able, the strong duality property has been proved, which
has enabled us to develop a distributed algorithm for the
NBS. Using synthetic and real-world data traces, we have
demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed framework.
In particular, our results confirm that ESPs with resource
deficits and surpluses can improve their utilities as well as
application satisfaction by sharing resources.
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